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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 These consolidated appeals require us to determine 
whether a Pennsylvania state trooper unlawfully prolonged a 
traffic stop. Appellants Jerry Fruit and Tykei Garner challenge 
the District Court’s denial of their joint motion to suppress 
evidence, claiming the traffic stop violated their Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. 
Garner also claims the District Court erred when it allowed the 
Government to use his prior drug conviction as Rule 404(b) 
evidence. Finally, Garner contends the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of a conspiracy to distribute heroin 
and cocaine. We will affirm. 
I 
On July 5, 2016, Pennsylvania State Trooper Kent 
Ramirez stopped a car with a New York license plate for 
speeding on Interstate 81 near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Prior 
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to the stop, Trooper Ramirez ran the license plate and learned 
the car was owned by Enterprise Rent-A-Car, though it lacked 
the typical bar code rental stickers.  
The entire traffic stop was recorded on Trooper 
Ramirez’s dashcam. When Ramirez approached the passenger 
side of the vehicle, he smelled a strong odor of air freshener 
and noticed that each vent had an air freshener clipped to it. 
Ramirez identified himself, asked for the driver’s license, and 
explained that the driver was going 75 miles per hour in an area 
with a posted speed limit of 55. Because traffic was noisy, 
Ramirez asked the driver to exit the vehicle so they could talk 
on the side of the road. 
The driver identified himself as Jerry Fruit and gave 
Ramirez his driver’s license and rental car agreement. In 
response to an inquiry from Ramirez, Fruit said he was 
traveling from Manhattan to Hagerstown, Maryland to visit his 
cousin for about two days. He also identified his passenger, 
Tykei Garner, as his cousin. The rental agreement listed Fruit 
as the authorized driver of the vehicle, but limited to the state 
of New York. And the agreement stated that it covered a rental 
period of June 11–15, so it appeared to have expired twenty 
days before the traffic stop. Id. When Ramirez asked about that 
discrepancy, Fruit explained that he was in a car accident, his 
car had been in the shop for a month, and the rental agreement 
was through his insurance company.  
Before he returned to his cruiser to run Fruit’s license 
and contact Enterprise about the status of Fruit’s rental 
contract, Trooper Ramirez asked Fruit a series of questions 
about his employment, prior traffic tickets, and criminal 
history. Fruit asked Ramirez what these questions had to do 
with his speeding violation, and Ramirez responded that the 
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questions were “part of [his] traffic stop, okay?” App. III, 
Traffic Stop Video at 7:26–7:28. 
About six minutes after he stopped the car, Trooper 
Ramirez asked the passenger (Garner) to get out of the car so 
he could question him. Garner responded that Fruit was 
dropping him off in Greencastle, Pennsylvania to visit his 
girlfriend, but said he would return to New York the next day 
to attend a court hearing.1 He also admitted he had a suspended 
license for failure to pay child support. When Ramirez 
continued to ask him about his criminal history, Garner added 
that he had been arrested for fighting. Garner also clarified that 
Fruit was not his biological relative, though he considered him 
family. As with Fruit, Ramirez asked Garner questions 
unrelated to the traffic stop, including about his criminal 
history.  
Twelve minutes into the traffic stop, Trooper Ramirez 
returned to his vehicle to check with Enterprise on the status of 
the rental agreement and to verify Fruit’s and Garner’s driving 
records and criminal histories. Ramirez later explained at the 
suppression hearing that he had to input their information into 
his computer manually, which could take between twelve to 
fifteen minutes for two people. Ramirez learned from the 
computer search that neither Fruit nor Garner had any 
outstanding warrants, although Fruit was on supervised release 
 
1 The District Court found that Garner said they would 
be returning for court the next day while Fruit said he was 
going to Maryland for about two days. That finding is clearly 
erroneous. When Ramirez asked Garner if they were coming 
back together, Garner said: “Actually, I have to go to court” for 
“child support. . . . Headed back tomorrow, hopefully.” Traffic 
Stop Video at 9:37–9:46 (emphasis added). 
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for a federal crime. He also learned that both men had extensive 
criminal records, including drug and weapons crimes. Ramirez 
then called the Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center, 
which reported that both men had been subjects of high 
intensity drug trafficking area investigations. Finally, 
Enterprise confirmed that Fruit had extended the rental 
agreement beyond the listed expiration date.  
After learning all these things, Trooper Ramirez 
resolved to ask permission to search the vehicle but waited for 
backup before doing so. The backup officer, Trooper Severin 
Thierwechter, arrived 37 minutes into the stop, at about 9:29 
pm. Trooper Ramirez then asked Fruit if he could search the 
car, but Fruit declined. Ramirez responded that he had “enough 
to believe that there may be criminal activity going on.” Traffic 
Stop Video at 37:55–37:59. Ramirez then advised Fruit that he 
was calling for a K-9 unit and Fruit was not free to leave. At 
9:31 p.m., Ramirez called for a K-9 unit, and Trooper John 
Mearkle arrived with dog Zigi 17 minutes later—56 minutes 
into the stop. Ramirez told Mearkle that he suspected criminal 
conduct because Fruit and Garner gave “conflicting stories,” 
had “long criminal histories,” and were “very nervous.” Traffic 
Stop Video at 58:33–58:45. When Mearkle brought Zigi to the 
car, Zigi alerted twice at the passenger side door. Zigi then 
entered the vehicle and alerted in the back seat and trunk. The 
troopers searched the car themselves and found bags 
containing 300 grams of cocaine and 261 grams of heroin in 
the trunk. So they arrested Fruit and Garner.  
Fruit and Garner were indicted for conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and possession with 
intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. They moved to suppress 
the evidence seized during the traffic stop, arguing  that they 
were seized in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights 
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because Trooper Ramirez extended the traffic stop longer than 
was necessary to issue the speeding ticket and lacked 
reasonable suspicion to engage in the ensuing criminal 
investigation. The District Court denied their motion, ruling 
that Trooper Ramirez had “an escalating degree of reasonable 
suspicion” that justified extending the stop. Fruit App. 26. 
In 2018, Fruit pleaded guilty to both counts under a plea 
agreement preserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress. Garner was convicted of both counts by a 
jury. Garner moved for judgment of acquittal and a new trial, 
which the District Court denied. The Court sentenced Fruit and 
Garner each to the mandatory minimum of 120 months’ 
imprisonment with both counts to run concurrently. They 
appealed and we consolidated their cases for argument and 
disposition. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s factual 
findings in support of its order denying the motion to suppress 
for clear error and its legal determinations de novo. United 
States v. Lewis, 672 F.3d 232, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2012). Because 
the District Court denied the suppression motion, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the Government. United 
States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002).  
III 
We begin by addressing Fruit and Garner’s argument 
that the District Court erred when it denied their motion to 
suppress evidence. Trooper Ramirez paced Fruit driving 75 
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miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, so there is no dispute 
that the initial traffic stop was lawful. The question here is 
whether it became unlawful because it was “prolonged beyond 
the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission.” 
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).  
The Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth 
Amendment allows an officer to conduct unrelated 
investigations that do not lengthen a roadside detention. 
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). But if these 
investigations “measurably extend the duration of the stop,” 
the seizure becomes unlawful unless otherwise supported by 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Id. at 333 (internal 
citation omitted). The lawful seizure “ends when tasks tied to 
the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 
(2015) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 
(1985)).  
Rodriguez is the precedent most relevant to this appeal. 
There, K-9 officer Morgan Struble stopped Rodriguez for 
driving erratically. 575 U.S. at 351. After Struble checked 
Rodriguez’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, he 
returned to the car, asked for the passenger’s license, and 
questioned the occupants about their travel plans. Id. Struble 
ran the passenger’s license, found no outstanding warrants or 
other problems, and called for backup. He returned the 
documents to Rodriguez and the passenger and completed the 
traffic stop by issuing Rodriguez a written warning. But instead 
of sending Rodriguez on his way, Struble asked permission to 
walk his dog around the vehicle. Id. at 352. When Rodriguez 
refused, Struble ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle while 
he waited for backup. After the second officer arrived, Struble 
then searched the car and the dog alerted to the presence of 
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drugs some seven or eight minutes after he issued the written 
warning to Rodriguez. Id. 
The Supreme Court held that an officer may not extend 
the stop to conduct a dog sniff unless there is reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic violation. Id. 
at 357–58. It observed that an officer’s mission when making 
a traffic stop includes determining “whether to issue a traffic 
ticket” and making “‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic 
stop.’” Id. at 355 (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408). A dog 
sniff aimed at “detecting evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing” unrelated to the stop “is not fairly characterized 
as part of the officer’s traffic mission.” Id. at 355–56 (internal 
citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).  
A 
This Court has issued two opinions in the wake of 
Rodriguez: United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2018), 
and United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2018). In 
Clark, we held a lawful traffic stop was unlawfully extended 
when an officer began unreasonably questioning a driver about 
his criminal history after tasks tied to the mission of the traffic 
stop “reasonably should have been[] completed.” 902 F.3d at 
410 (internal citation omitted). Although the officer questioned 
the driver for just 20 seconds, we noted that the brevity of the 
questioning did not bear on whether the questions were off-
mission. Id. at 410 n.4.  
In Green, we recognized the difficulty in pinpointing 
the moment when tasks tied to the traffic stop are completed or 
reasonably should have been completed (what we called the 
“Rodriguez moment”). We also recognized the possibility that 
the Rodriguez moment occurs when an officer no longer 
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pursues the tasks tied to the traffic stop even though he 
reasonably could have continued with those tasks. 897 F.3d at 
182 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355) (explaining that an 
officer waiting for backup due to danger inherent in traffic 
stops ordinarily does not measurably prolong the traffic stop 
but complexity is added to the analysis when the officer calls 
for backup and then does not wait for backup to arrive). Thus, 
we determined in Green that the Rodriguez moment occurred 
no later than when the officer issued the traffic citation, but 
“instructed Green to wait in his car indefinitely.” 897 F.3d at 
181. We also determined that the Rodriguez moment occurred 
at the earliest when the officer pursued an off-mission task by 
making a phone call related to drug trafficking and was “no 
longer concerned with the moving violation.” Id. at 182. Even 
assuming the earlier Rodriguez moment in Green, we still held 
the seizure was constitutional because the officer already had 
reasonable suspicion at that point. Id.  
So what tasks ordinarily are tied to the mission of a 
traffic stop? They include: “checking the driver’s license, 
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the 
driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof 
of insurance.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (internal citation 
omitted). We have also held that some questions relating to a 
driver’s travel plans ordinarily fall within the scope of the 
traffic stop, as do delays caused by safety concerns related to 
the stop. United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d Cir. 
2003); Clark, 902 F.3d at 410. 
To lawfully extend a stop beyond when tasks tied to its 
initial mission are completed or reasonably should have been 
completed, an officer must have an objectively reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that illegal activity had occurred or was 
occurring. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Clark, 902 F.3d at 410. 
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In determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, 
we consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole 
picture.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
This standard requires “considerably less than proof of 
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,” United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), but requires more than 
a “hunch.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). Reasonable 
suspicion depends on both the “information possessed by 
police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 
B 
The District Court denied the motion to suppress in 
2017, before we decided Green and Clark, so it did not 
determine when the “Rodriguez moment” occurred. Instead, it 
found that Trooper Ramirez’s observations throughout the 
traffic stop created an “amalgam of information . . . that 
triggered [his] suspicion that a crime was afoot beyond a 
moving violation.” App. 25.  
Our review of the video and audio record leads us to 
conclude that the earliest the Rodriguez moment occurred was 
when Trooper Ramirez began asking Fruit about his 
employment, family, criminal history, and other conduct 
unrelated to the traffic stop. After informing Fruit that he was 
speeding, Ramirez collected Fruit’s driver’s license and rental 
agreement. He noted the rental agreement had expired, but 
Fruit assured him he had extended the rental term. Before he 
returned to his cruiser to investigate the status of Fruit’s rental 
agreement, Ramirez questioned Fruit for five minutes about his 
criminal history. This questioning was not tied to the traffic 
stop’s mission—the speeding violation—because it was 
“aimed at detecting criminal activity more generally.” Green, 
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897 F.3d at 179. But if Trooper Ramirez had reasonable 
suspicion when he began questioning Fruit about his criminal 
history, even if such questioning at that moment measurably 
extended the traffic stop, there is no Fourth Amendment 
violation.  
We hold Trooper Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to 
extend the stop based on information he obtained during the 
first few minutes of the traffic stop and before he engaged in 
any unrelated investigation. So no unlawful extension of the 
traffic stop ever occurred. When Ramirez first spotted the car, 
he noticed it had a New York license plate and appeared to be 
a rental car. After learning the vehicle belonged to Enterprise, 
he noticed it did not have the typical bar code stickers on the 
driver’s window or the rear windshield. These observations 
aroused his suspicion because, in Ramirez’s experience, rental 
vehicles usually had these stickers unless someone peeled them 
off in violation of a rental agreement.  
As Trooper Ramirez approached the vehicle, he smelled 
a strong odor of air freshener and saw air fresheners clipped on 
every vent, which was abnormal in his experience. Ramirez’s 
questions related to the traffic stop revealed that Fruit was 
traveling along I-81 between New York City and Hagerstown, 
which Ramirez knew to be a drug trafficking corridor. Ramirez 
also saw that the rental agreement had expired two weeks 
earlier and Fruit seemed extremely nervous throughout the 
stop. In their totality, these factors are sufficient to show that 
Trooper Ramirez’s suspicion of illegal activity was objectively 
reasonable. So he could extend the traffic stop and Fruit and 




 Fruit also argues that Trooper Ramirez exercised a lack 
of diligence in his stop, rendering it tantamount to an arrest 
requiring probable cause. Fruit contends that Ramirez should 
not have waited for another trooper to arrive before seeking 
consent or calling for a K-9 unit. Instead, Fruit claims Ramirez 
should have called the K-9 unit before he asked Fruit for 
permission to search the vehicle. We are unpersuaded. 
 Fruit correctly notes that a stop must be “sufficiently 
limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an 
investigative seizure.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
(1983) (plurality opinion). But Trooper Ramirez had 
reasonable suspicion to justify further investigation before he 
even questioned Fruit. And Ramirez explained he called for 
backup before asking to search the vehicle because it was 
starting to get dark, Fruit had a previous firearms offense, and 
he is smaller than Fruit and Garner. He called for backup for 
officer safety, which is consistent with the mission of any 
traffic stop. See Clark, 902 F.3d at 410. As the Supreme Court 
has instructed, “[t]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with 
danger to police officers,’ . . . so an officer may need to take 
certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete 
his mission safely.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 In the 25 minutes between Trooper Ramirez’s return to 
his vehicle and Trooper Thierwechter’s arrival, Ramirez not 
only ran Fruit and Garner’s records—which he said could take 
15 minutes or more since the two lived out of state—but also 
made the phone calls to Enterprise and the Pennsylvania 
Criminal Intelligence Center. Ramirez called for backup only 
after running Fruit and Garner’s records and making those 
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calls. Thierwechter arrived within ten or fifteen minutes, so this 
brief delay burdened Fruit only negligibly.  
Fruit also argues that Trooper Ramirez should have 
called for the K-9 unit before asking for consent to search. But 
this argument fails because we have observed no lack of 
diligence by officers in waiting to call for K-9 units until after 
the suspect has denied consent. See United States v. Frost, 999 
F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1993). Trooper Ramirez thus acted 
diligently and needed only reasonable suspicion to conduct the 
dog sniff, which he had. See Green, 897 F.3d at 179–80. 
V 
 In addition to adopting Fruit’s unsuccessful arguments, 
Garner raises two additional issues particular to his appeal. The 
first involves the admission of evidence and the second relates 
to his motion for judgment of acquittal. We consider each in 
turn.  
A 
 At trial, the Government sought to introduce evidence 
of Garner’s 2005 conviction for possession of cocaine, his 
2007 conviction for sale of cocaine, and a pending charge from 
2016 for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. The 
District Court admitted Garner’s 2007 New York City cocaine 
trafficking conviction as evidence of knowledge of the cocaine 
in the car and his intent to distribute it. But it did not admit 
Garner’s drug possession charges from 2005 and 2016, 
because they were not relevant to this distribution charge.  
 Garner urges us to overturn our precedent that a 
conviction makes “the defendant’s knowledge of the presence 
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of heroin more probable than it would have been without the 
evidence as it indicates that he had knowledge of [the drug 
trade], thus making it less likely that he was in the wrong place 
at the wrong time.” Garner Br. at 20–21 (citing Givan, 320 F.3d 
at 461 (admitting a previous cocaine conviction to prove 
knowledge and intent to distribute heroin)). This is a nonstarter 
because only the Court sitting en banc can overturn a prior 
precedent. Joyce v. Maersk Line Ltd., 876 F.3d 502, 508 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  
 Garner also argues the District Court’s admission of his 
2007 drug trafficking conviction was error under Rules 403 
and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We review this 
decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Butch, 256 
F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 Rule 404(b) provides “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or 
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.” But that evidence “may be 
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” FED. R. EVID. 
404(b)(1)–(2).  
 According to Garner, his 2007 drug trafficking 
conviction dealt with different facts than those present in this 
appeal and occurred too long ago to be admissible. He notes 
that his first conviction involved distributing cocaine on a 
street corner while this case involves distributing cocaine and 
heroin in a car. He also argues that a cocaine conviction does 
not prove that he knew what heroin looks like or how it is sold. 
He also contends the District Court failed under Federal Rule 
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of Evidence 403 to properly balance the probative value of the 
evidence against its prejudicial effect.  
  We apply a four-part test to determine whether prior-
acts evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b). United States v. 
Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Huddleston 
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988) (discussing the 
four sources protecting against undue prejudice of admitting 
Rule 404(b) evidence). Such evidence is admissible if it is: (1) 
offered for a non-propensity purpose; (2) relevant to that 
identified purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 so 
its probative value is not outweighed by any inherent danger of 
unfair prejudice; and (4) “accompanied by a limiting 
instruction, if requested.” Davis, 726 F.3d at 441.  
 Garner’s 2007 conviction showed that he had personal 
knowledge about how to identify cocaine, how to traffic it, and 
how to package, price, and purchase it in New York. If Garner 
had that knowledge, he could purchase and package drugs in 
New York, before transporting them to Hagerstown for sale. 
So his prior conviction showed that Garner had the intent and 
knowledge to sell packaged cocaine in his possession.  
 After finding the 2007 cocaine distribution charge 
relevant, the District Court then balanced its probative value 
with its prejudicial impact. The Court determined that the 
conviction’s probative value outweighed the danger of unfair 
prejudice because intent and knowledge are critical to proving 
a conspiracy. Finally, the Court agreed that it would issue a 
limiting instruction when requested. As a result, the Court 
admitted the 2007 conviction into evidence.  
 The Court admitted the 2007 cocaine trafficking 
conviction to prove knowledge of cocaine and how to sell it, 
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not to prove intent and knowledge of packaging heroin. 
Because the Court admitted the evidence only to prove cocaine 
distribution, the difference between the charges on which 
Garner was being tried and his prior conviction would be that 
one took place in a car and the other took place on a street 
corner. This difference would not affect Garner’s knowledge 
of how to identify, package, and sell cocaine. So Garner’s 
argument about the cases’ dissimilarity fails. The District 
Court correctly applied Huddleston and did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting Garner’s cocaine distribution 
conviction with a limiting instruction. 
B 
 Finally, Garner claims the District Court erred when it 
denied his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. He notes 
that “[t]here was no evidence presented at trial that [he and 
Fruit] ever had any communications regarding distribution of 
heroin or cocaine.” Garner Br. 30. That’s true, but immaterial. 
Here, the Government relied on circumstantial evidence to 
prove its case. See, e.g., United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 
132, 160 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 
238 (3d Cir. 2007). Viewing the record, as we must, in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, United States v. Smith, 294 
F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002), ample evidence supported 
Garner’s conspiracy conviction. 
 That evidence included that: (1) Fruit and Garner were 
travelling together from New York City (a known drug hub) to 
Hagerstown (a known drug destination); (2) the rental bar code 
had been removed from the vehicle; (3) air fresheners were 
attached to each air vent; and (4) Trooper Ramirez pulled the 
car over just before 9:00 p.m., with an hour left to reach 
Greencastle, yet Garner said he planned to travel the next day 
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the four hours back to New York for a court hearing. The 
Government also elicited testimony that, despite statements by 
Garner to Trooper Ramirez regarding a court hearing involving 
child support, there was no record of any such hearing 
scheduled in the state of New York involving Garner. Evidence 
at trial also revealed that Garner minimized his criminal history 
when he told Trooper Ramirez that he had been arrested for 
fighting while neglecting to mention his extensive history of 
drug possession and trafficking. A rational trier of fact could 
find that Garner lied about his drug history because he knew 
the car contained narcotics. Finally, the two defendants 
traveled with cocaine and heroin worth over $20,000 in their 
car and Garner knew about the cocaine trade. 
  Viewing this evidence as a whole, a rational juror could 
conclude that Garner agreed with Fruit to possess and 
distribute the heroin and cocaine in the vehicle. So the District 
Court did not err in denying the Rule 29 motion. 
* * * 
The District Court did not err when it denied Fruit and 
Garner’s joint motion to suppress the evidence of drug 
trafficking seized during the traffic stop. Nor did the Court err 
when it allowed the Government to use Garner’s 2007 drug 
conviction as Rule 404(b) evidence or when it found that the 
Government adduced sufficient evidence to convict Garner of 
conspiring with Fruit to distribute heroin and cocaine. We will 
therefore affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences. 
